We consider payout policy as a governance mechanism. Available payout methods are dividends and open-market stock repurchase programs. Dividends eliminate agency costs of free cash flow by forcing cash out but may result is under-investment if the paid cash is later needed for operations. Open-market programs avoid the under-investment problem by leaving insiders (management) the option to cancel the payout. Instead, they stimulate payout by providing trading gains to these better informed insiders at the expense of the general shareholders. Because their execution is optional, open-market programs cannot always prevent the waste of free cash. Payout policy is thus determined as a trade off between eliminating agency problems (with dividends) and preserving financial flexibility (with open-market programs).
result in under-investment whereas not forcing the cash out may result in over-investment. The shareholders' problem is thus how to get managers (insiders) finish the job and return cash to investors without hurting investment when only the management gets to observe whether this cash is free or not. The "do nothing" alternative is having no payout policy at all. Many firms do not pay out cash and find this to be the optimal strategy. They of course accept the agency problem but guarantee that investment will not be shaved, at least as far as the firm's budget allows. These are usually growth firms for which on the one hand financial flexibility is crucial and on the other hand agency costs of free cash are low. Dividend, we suggest, is the predetermined payout program alternative. Dividends become a commitment once declared by the board. They are generally paid immediately (within few weeks) and informally commit the firm for future dividends. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that dividends are sticky regardless of the investment prospects (Lintner 1956 ). Thus, firms that pay dividend may need to shave investment. Dividend paying firms, however, are generally mature firms for which it is relatively easy to predict how much cash is needed to support growth and operations, and what portion of the cash they generate is free. In these firms the benefits from reducing the agency costs of free cash with a pre-determined program are significantly higher than the expected costs from reducing financial flexibility by pre-committing to a payout. An open-market repurchase program, we suggest, is the (costly) payout-incentivising mechanism.
Specifically, an open-market program leaves the management (insiders) the option not to pay out the cash when the cash is needed for operations. On the other hand, it incentivises payout when cash is not needed for operations by providing these better informed insiders with trading gains that replace their benefit from wasting free cash. The general shareholders lose from the insiders' informed trade, but at the same time they benefit from preserving financial flexibility and alleviating the free-cash-waste problem, although not completely eliminating it.
This paper develops a model of payout policy to support the above arguments. The model predicts that better governance and controls as well as higher insider ownership will lead to more use of repurchases over dividends. It also predicts that higher uncertainty about the size of the investment opportunity as well as higher return on investment are associated with less payout; More specifically, firms will not pay out dividends if return on investment is high, but may still repurchase as long as uncertainty about investment size is not too high. However, when both return on investment and uncertainty about the size of their investment opportunities are high, firms will not pay out cash at all.
The model highlights two important properties of open-market programs that dividends do not have and may explain their increasing popularity. First, the model highlights the importance of the flexibility of open-market programs, i.e. the option not to repurchase, should the availability of free cash change.
1 Modern corporations face increasing need for agility and open-market programs provide just that. Dividends lack this property as they become a commitment once declared, and commit firms to future dividends (the stock market penalties for dividend reductions are well documented (e.g. Aharony and Suary (1980) ). Second, the model suggests that open-market programs stimulate payout of free cash by providing gains to insiders through the firm's informed trade. Given the increasing cash retention rates of corporations, 2 and "the disappearing dividends" (Fama and French (2001) , DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2000, 2004) ), open-market programs may have thus evolved as a mechanism that incentivises payout where dividends failed (e.g. when Microsoft finally started to pay out cash, excluding the one-time special dividend, the payout was designed to be executed mostly through an open-market program rather than dividends. Other maturing tech giants seem to follow). This argument is also consistent with the evidence that the growth in repurchase programs began only long after the propensity to pay dividends started to decrease.
Most of the literature on payout policy focuses on the importance of taxes and on signaling motivation. The tax based literature suggests that payout policy is determined by taxes because a payout triggers a tax liability. Taxes, however, have become less relevant for payout policy over the years since the tax rates on dividends (income) and repurchases (capital gains) were both reduced and recently equalized (in 2003) , suggesting that, at least after the tax rate changes, other motivations have become important too. Signaling theories originate in Spence (1973) idea that high-ability workers can take actions to distinguish themselves from low-ability workers. The common application of this idea in the finance literature for payout policy is that good firms initiate/increase dividends or stock buybacks to distinguish themselves from bad firms. In Spence's story, a job is at stake so incurring the cost of signaling makes sense.
For dividends and open-market repurchase programs, however, the documented announcement return is only at 2-3%. Although this return is found to be statistically significant, economically it does not seem to justify the costs.
3 Thus, although signaling may be an interesting side effect it does not seem to be the driving force behind payout policy. We, instead, suggest that the 1 Many buyback programs are not completed. See for example Stephens and Weisbach (1998) . Supporting evidence on the flexibility of open-market programs is provided in Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000), Guay and Harford (2000) , and Brav et al. (2005) .
2 Although, corporations have been steadily increasing their payout, the "cash problem" of corporations has worsened. E.g. cash holdings for S&P 500 firms are as twice as high in 2005 as they were in 1999. See (Business week July 18, 2005) .
3 Perhaps this is because the signal is ambiguous. Does an increase in payout mean that the firm is confident in its ability to pay cash in the future, or does it signal that the firm does not have good investment opportunities any more? The signaling story makes more sense for self tender offer repurchases where the documented announcement return is substantially higher.(See for example Comment and Jarrel (1991) ).
agency costs of free cash flow on the one hand and the need for financial flexibility on the other hand are the driving forces behind payout policy, the main issue being: how to make sure that managers finish the job under asymmetric information without hurting investment. Once more, we suggest that at the heart of payout policy is the question how to get the free cash out without reducing financial flexibility.
Very few theoretical papers in payout policy consider the agency costs of free cash. Most closely related to this paper are Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) , and Lucas and McDonald (1998) . These papers build tensions based on asymmetric taxation of dividends and repurchases and focus on signaling results. Once announced, the repurchases in these models are not optional and thus apply more to tender offers rather than to open-market programs. 4 Free cash flow based models are more common in capital structure theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the dis-alignment between managers interest and shareholders interest creates agency problems. Jensen (1986) focuses this agency problem on the waste of free cash and suggests that debt may solve the problem by removing the free cash. Models like Zwibel (1996) , Fluck (1999) , and Myers (2000) suggest that threats of takeovers are enough to discipline managers to disburse free cash. We instead suggest that, most of the time, these threats may not be material or may be too costly for the shareholders, and hence, incentives (e.g. trading gains) may do a better job. The agency costs of free-cash-flow theory has been criticized (e.g. Myers (2003, page 243) ) that it takes it as given that insiders will spend free cash but does not explain why they would do so. In this paper, however, we also address this issue by modeling the agency problem at a primitive level.
The distortion of investment caused by payout has been used in Miller and Rock (1985) as a basis for a (dividend) signaling model. Grullon Michaely and Swaminatan (2002) maturity theory suggests that as firms mature both risks and investment needs will decrease so that firms will have more cash and will start paying dividends. Stultz (1990) considers both the over-investment and under-investment problems to explain debt policy. In his model, payment to debt is the predetermined payout mechanism that solves the over-investment problem at the cost of exacerbating the under-investment problem. The role of dividends in our model is similar to the role of debt in Stultz's model. Debt, however, creates its own agency problems/costs.
In the conclusion of their recent survey of payout policy, Allen and Michaely (2003, page 420) suggest that "We still do not have a firm understanding of what determines the choice [between repurchases and dividends]... and how payout as a whole interact with capital structure decisions." When combined with Stultz (1990) , our model may provide an explanation.
Specifically, there is a pecking order in which certain components of free cash are paid through debt (interest), less certain components with dividends, and the most uncertain components are paid with open-market programs, where the actual mix depends on the need for financial flexibility and on how sever agency costs of free cash are. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of payout policy. Section 3 discusses implications of our results. Section 4 Concludes.
A model of payout policy
There are three dates indexed by t = 1, 2, 3. All agents are risk neutral, the interest rate is zero and there are no taxes or transaction costs. We consider an all-equity financed firm. At t = 0 the firm has an endowment E and an investment opportunity (project). The size of the investment opportunity is uncertain at t = 0 and is indicated by a random variableĨ. At t = 1, the investment opportunity is realized to be either I = E (large) or I = E − C (small) with equal probability, where 0 < C < E. The portion of the endowment that is not needed for the investment then becomes "free cash." Thus, the level of free cash is realized to be either 0 or C depending on whether the investment opportunity is realized to be large or small, respectively. At t = 2, funds that were invested at t = 1 generate return of α > 1 at t = 2 where we denote α (E − C) ≡ A, and αE ≡ A + X for tractability of the analysis to follow. Note that
and hence X C reflects return on investment, whereas
and hence X A reflects the uncertainty in the size of the investment opportunity and availability of free cash when investment opportunity is realized to be low. There are N shares outstanding at t = 0 and we normalize the values of A, X, C, E to be values per share using lowercase letters a, x, c, e, respectively. Agency problem is as follows. A fraction β of the shares is held by insiders, where 0 < β < 0.5, and the rest is held by outside shareholders. The outside shareholders are thus the majority and can dictate the (payout) policies of the firm, whereas insiders run the firm on behalf of all the shareholders. Each investor group acts to maximizes its own wealth. Information is symmetric at t = 0. However, at t = 1 the realization ofĨ is observed by the insiders only. Any funds that were not invested in the project at t = 1 (i.e. all free cash) get completely wasted by the insiders between t = 1 and t = 2, unless they are paid out immediately at t = 1. The insiders realize private benefits of γ on every dollar they waste where 0 < γ < 1. 6 The waste of free cash is thus costly to all shareholders, but benefits from the waste are enjoyed only by insiders. At t = 2 all information is public, the firm is dismantled and shareholders get paid in proportion to their ownership.
Thus, if investment opportunity realized is always fully utilized, the terminal value of the firm is either A or A + X with equal probability, regardless of whether or not the cash gets paid out. Indeed one can verify that in this case the expected terminal firm value is
Some elaboration on the parameters γ and β is warranted. The parameter γ captures the insiders benefits from waste. We argue that this is a quality of governance parameter. Specifically, insiders always find a way to waste free cash. However, when governance is bad, insiders are able to spend directly on things they benefit from the most (i.e. perks), whereas when governance is good this is not an option. Instead, the insiders are only able to waste free cash on things that "look like" they are good for the firm (e.g. bad projects). Naturally these spending provide insiders with lower γ. Consequently, better governance and monitoring are associated with lower γ because they make it harder for insiders to choose wasting activities in which the private benefits are high and hence easily detected. For example, γ is relatively low if the insiders use excess cash to hire redundant employees. It is higher if they can use it to pay for excessive business trips, and even higher if they can spend it on vacation trips. It is relatively easy to present hiring redundant employees and other "empire building" activities as necessary expenses.
7 It is much harder to do so with excessive business trips and even harder with vacation trips. In short, waste activities with high γ have less apparent relevance to firm value enhancement, and hence we argue that better governance is associated with lower γ. 6 We assume that insiders cannot prevent the waste of free cash under their control, even if it is in their interest as a group not to do so. For example, this could be a coordination problem among the insiders, in which the incentive of each one of them to deviate from the insider social optimum is too strong. Sooner or later one insider will find a way to waste the free cash and privately enjoy the benefit. (In this case γ should be thought of as expected private benefits from waste.) 7 These are waste activities that "look like" they benefit the firm and can be easily presented as essential. Naturally the private benefits for the insiders relative to the waste from these activites are low (γ is low).
The naive interpretation for β is insiders' ownership. But in practice β can be higher than the ownership if, for example, insiders have stock options or have compensation contracts that are pegged to the growth. This of course would come at the expense of outside shareholders, as we take α (return on investment) as exogenous (i.e. the insiders always exert maximum effort to maximize the asset value). We bound β away from zero because insiders likely always get a share of the pie, and away from 0.5 because we want to consider the situation in which outsiders can dictate policies. 8 The parameter β has to do with the zero sum game between insiders and outsiders, as opposed to γ which directly affects only the insiders.
We will generally omit the time index for t = 1 as most of the action happens on this date. At t = 1 there is a market for the stock. Liquidity traders place quantity bids Q A < N 3 and Q B < N 3 they want to buy and sell respectively. The market maker sets prices p A , p B in the buy and sell markets, respectively, before investors place their quantity bids (anticipating the possibility of informed trade from the firm side) to earn zero expected profit. Payout Policy -At t = 0 the outside shareholders can demand dividend, approve an open-market program, or do nothing. A dividend forces cash out immediately at t = 0. An open-market program announcement authorizes, but does not commit, the insiders to buy back shares at t = 1. The execution of the program is performed at the firms' (insiders') discretion and the information whether the firm repurchased or not becomes public only at t = 2.
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The analysis to follow will show that if the policy is no payout at all (do nothing), the firm has very good financial flexibility, however, all free cash is wasted. The good thing about dividend is that all cash taken out is saved (not wasted); the bad thing about dividend is that it may cause a sever shaving of investment if investment opportunity is realized to be high. (Like most models on payout policy we assume that borrowing is not allowed.) The good thing about open-market programs is that they allow the insiders to cancel the payout (refrain from eventually buying shares at t = 1) if it turns out that the firm does not have 8 It is not clear that outsiders are the decision makers, and even if they are, that they do not consider insiders' wealth too. This may depend on the level of the parameter β. We, however, want to consider payout policy as a governance mechanism , and hence focus on a principal-agent framework in which the outside shareholders are the principal and the insider shareholders are the agent. In an extension it is possible to investigate what happens when insiders are in control. 9 The market mechanism we use is standard and is empolyed, for example, in Noe (2002) . We focus on t = 1 because this is where the repurchase takes place, but it could be assumed that the market opens also at t = 0 and t = 2. The restriction on liquidity trade is without loss of generality in order to limit the discussion to the feasible range of the results. 10 In the US the board announces dividends and authorizes repurchase programs. In most other countries these practices must be approved either by the board or by the shareholders. In the US there is no reporting requirement of actual repurchases other than in the financial statement. The regulation of actual repurchases in other countries is more restrictive.
free cash so that financial flexibility is still retained. However, unlike with dividend, with an open-market program, the insiders may either choose to waste free cash on perks, or, instead, choose to repurchase for trading gains at uninformed shareholders' expense. If the insiders do repurchase for trading gains, the outside shareholders may still benefit because the cash is paid out. Specifically, when the firm buys back shares, cash spent on repurchase reduces the share base instead of getting wasted so all remaining shareholders enjoy value appreciation on a per share basis.
Definition 1 Equilibrium is a set consisting of 1) payout policy set by the outside shareholders that specifies either a dividend, or an open-market program announcement, or no-payout, 2) prices p A , p B , set by the market maker given the payout policy, and 3) a repurchase strategy set by the insiders if the payout policy is an open-market program, given p A , p B , such that the market maker makes zero expected profit and each shareholder group (insiders and outsiders) maximizes its wealth given the information it has.
In the next subsection we analyze the effect of dividend assuming it is the only available payout method. Then, we will analyze the effect of a repurchase program assuming it is the only available payout method. Last, we combine the results from these two subsections to characterize payout policy, i.e. to suggest how outside shareholders will choose between dividend, an open-market repurchase program, and no payout.
Dividend
At t = 0 the outside shareholders can force/pay dividend D where 0 ≤ D ≤ E. Suppose that dividend is the only available payout method. In this case, if later the investment opportunity is realized to be low (I = E − C), then with D ≤ C, cash would be saved and investment would not be hurt. However, if instead the investment opportunity is realized to be high (I = E) the firm cannot fully utilize the opportunity and has to shave investment. The firm value depending on D is thus
where
Lemma 1 Given that the payout policy is dividend, the expected firm value (including the dividend) is maximized by choosing D = C if α < 2 and D = 0 otherwise.
Proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions appear in the Appendix. Intuitively, there is some level of return on investment α below which preventing the waste of free cash is more important than not shaving investment, and above which the situation is reversed.
Dividend wealth effects and optimal dividend
When dividend is the only available payout method, maximizing the value for outside shareholders is equivalent to maximizing the expected firm value (including the dividend). This is because dividends are pro-rata and hence the level of insider ownership β is irrelevant. Thus, given the result in Lemma 1, outside shareholders will demand a dividend of C if α < 2 and will not demand a dividend payment otherwise. Indeed, if D = 0, outsider shareholders' wealth is
hereas if D = C, outside shareholders' wealth is
The difference in outsiders' wealth between dividend of C and no dividend is
The outside shareholders decision to pay dividend depends on whether or not X < 2C which is equivalent to α < 2. That is, when dividend is the only available payout method, if α < 2, outside shareholders will choose D = C. Otherwise, they choose no dividend.
Repurchase
At t = 0 the outside shareholders may instead choose to announce a repurchase program. Suppose that this is the only available payout method. A repurchase program announcement publicly authorizes the management (insiders) to repurchase shares up to a value of C. Because informed trade is possible only in the buy market, in this subsection we focus on the buy market and denote Q A ≡ Q and p A ≡ p. Since the possible states are {A + X, A + C}, the firm can repurchase only in the state {A + C}. 11 Without loss of generality we will assume that insiders 11 It is immediate to show that outside shareholders will not authorize a program larger than C (because α > 1). Our results will show that whenever a repurchase can distribute the cash it is optimal to announce the will repurchase whenever indifferent.
Definition 2 Given a program announcement at t = 0, a Repurchase Equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the firm repurchases at t = 1 whenever it has free cash (i.e. in the state A + C).
In any repurchase equilibrium, the market maker zero-expected-profit condition is
This condition essentially requires that the average of the differences between the price that the market maker is willing to sell for and the terminal value of a share, weighted by the quantity he sells in each state, is equal to zero. The first term corresponds to the state in which investment opportunity is realized to be large and hence the firm has no free cash and therefore does not repurchase. The second term corresponds to the state in which investment opportunity is realized to be small and hence the decision to repurchase depends on the model parameters.
In a repurchase equilibrium the firm does repurchase in this state and the number of shares repurchased is . For condition (5) to hold, when the firm is repurchasing, it must be buying overvalued shares (because x > 0), however, it is happy to do so, because the alternative is that the cash would be wasted. An important feature of repurchases under asymmetric information that is reflected in the term
is the nonlinearity in value introduced through the firm's trade. Specifically, when the firm does repurchase to take advantage of its private information, the terminal per-share value increases not only because free cash that would otherwise be wasted is used to eliminate shares and hence the same terminal value is shared by a reduced number of shares but also because under asymmetric information the repurchase price can reflect only part of the increase in the value of the terminal shares. This further increases the motivation to repurchase the overvalued shares. The following Lemma presents the solution for the price p of (5) in a repurchase equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In any repurchase equilibrium, the price p at which the market maker sells at t = 1 is
whole amount C. We also assume away the situation in which insiders will repurchase when they do not have free cash (i.e. in the state A + X). Presumably when the level of free cash is realized, cash that is not free is already tied to the investment. and a + c < p < a + x.
Given that the state realized is {A + C} the insiders will execute the repurchase only if the terminal value of their shares with a repurchase is higher than the terminal value of their shares without it. That is, the firm (insiders) participation condition is
After rearrangement, the firm participation condition can be written as
The following Lemma combines condition (8) with the requirement that (5) holds to give a necessary condition for a repurchase equilibrium Lemma 3 A necessary condition for a repurchase equilibrium is β γ
Based on the results in Lemma 2, and Lemma 3 the following proposition characterizes existence of a repurchase equilibrium. 11) in the range
Proposition 1 A repurchase equilibrium always exists if
a repurchase equilibrium exists if c ≥ c R where
(13) Figure 1 demonstrates the results of Proposition 1 by means of a graph. The figure illustrates how existence of repurchase equilibrium depends on the variability in the value of assets in place, (11) holds), for the insiders, private benefits from waste are relatively high whereas insider ownership is low so that their share in waste prevention benefits through payout is too low. Thus, if γ β is high, the insiders will never repurchase regardless of firm characteristics (i.e. uncertainty and return on investment). As γ β decreases waste benefits are reduced relative to ownership and hence existence of repurchase equilibrium becomes dependant on firm characteristics. Specifically, benefits from waste are now relatively low whereas ownership is high. The decision to repurchase will now depend on the level of overvaluation in the state in which asset value is realized to be low (and the firm has cash to repurchase with). overvaluation, in turn, depends on the uncertainty in the size of the investment opportunity, . This is because both contribute to the uncertainty of the value of assets in place. If both of them are high (i.e in the range (12) if the condition c ≥ c R does not hold), the firm will not repurchase because overvaluation is too high and the insiders are better off wasting the cash.
12 This is because in this situation, for the insiders, benefits from waste prevention less trading losses from buying overvalued shares are lower than the benefits they can get from wasting the cash. Otherwise, if at least one of (10)), the resulting undervaluation is not too high so that the firm will execute the repurchase.
If a repurchase equilibrium does not exist then, most of the time, the firm (insiders) will not repurchase shares and the outcome is a no-repurchase equilibrium in which the cash gets wasted, there is no informed trade, and prices are set accordingly (i.e. analysis is the same as without repurchase announcement). However, there is also a small parameter range for which no equilibrium exists. That is, a repurchase equilibrium cannot hold, but no-repurchase 12 To see that high x c implies that the condition c ≥ c R does not hold, fix c and increase x. Because c is fixed then by (2) x a is fixed. So if x is increasing then a is increasing and hence by observation of (13) c R is increasing. There is thus some level of equilibrium also cannot hold. 13 Since in a no-repurchase equilibrium there is no point to announce a program, and since no-equilibrium is probably as bad for the outside shareholders as no-repurchase equilibrium, then in the analysis below we will assume that outside shareholders will never authorize (announce) an open-market program if a repurchase equilibrium does not exist.
Repurchase wealth effects optimal repurchase
One assumption we made earlier is that outsiders are in control and set payout policy to maximize their own wealth. In order to determine whether or not outside shareholders will announce a repurchase program (still assuming that repurchase is the only available payout method) we need to consider how the outside shareholders' wealth is affected by the announcement of a repurchase program.
When we considered wealth effects of dividend there was no informed trade and hence we could simply identify outsiders wealth with the value of the (1−β)N shares (including dividend). However, when the payout policy is repurchase, liquidity buyers are adversely affected from the firm's informed trade. On the other had, liquidity sellers are favorably affected because the price they receive at t = 1 reflects waste prevention of free cash. In case of a repurchase program announcement, we thus need to revisit the question: who's value are the outside shareholders maximizing. Specifically, we need to consider if the outsiders include the liquidity traders, in particular the liquidity buyers.
We will first make the assumption that insiders cannot trade their own shares in the market at t = 1. Presumably this would be trade based on private information and illegal. Thus, all liquidity sellers are outsiders. The harder question is whether outside shareholders care about the liquidity buyers (new shareholders). Because we are analyzing the problem in a principle-agent framework and because the outsiders are very likely to be the liquidity buyers themselves, we will include liquidity buyers in the maximization function. Thus, we suggest that the correct assumption is that outsiders are: original outsiders selling at t = 1 (liquidity sellers), original outsiders selling at t = 2 (outside stayers), and liquidity buyers at t = 1. That is, when considering whether to repurchase or not, the outsiders consider the wealth of 13 This situation happens when γ β is outside the range (10) but is not too high, a is very low relative to x and c is relatively high (close to x). In this pathological situation, no equilibrium exits. Intuitively, when γ β is not high or low and c is high, we may have a situation where the price that gives the market maker zero expected profit given no repurchase is too low so that it pays to deviate and repurchase, whereas the price that gives the market maker zero expected profit given a repurchase is too high so that it pays to deviate and waste the cash. Thus there is no equilibrium.
all investors other than the insiders.
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In Appendix B we calculate 1) each of the investor groups' wealth without a repurchase, 2) each of these investor groups' wealth with a repurchase and 3) the change in each investor groups' wealth with a repurchase in comparison to no repurchase. The analysis in Appendix B demonstrates that the wealth of outside shareholders as defined above (original outsider shareholders and liquidity buyers) is given by
Results for payout policy
We can now combine our results from subsections 2.1 and 2.3 to characterize payout policy. Our analysis in these subsections suggests that outside shareholders' wealth under different payout policies is as follows: With no payout:
With a repurchase program (in a repurchase equilibrium):
hen coming to choose payout policy, it is thus enough for the outside shareholders to compare the value of the following term:
No payout: 0 Dividend of C:
Open market repurchase program: Together, propositions 1 and 2 and the outside shareholders wealth terms above suggest the following: Whenever γ β is low, the firm will disburse cash with a repurchase program unless both uncertainty of investment opportunity is high, a repurchase equilibrium 14 In an extension it is possible to later investigate the alternative in which outsiders do not care about (do not include) the liquidity buyers or that they care about the insiders wealth. The alternative of considering only social (aggregate) wealth is probably not desirable because it ignores wealth transfers (expropriations) among investor groups. cannot hold, so the firm will disburse free cash with dividend if x c = α is low and will not disburse free cash otherwise. These results are summarized in Table 1 below. Table 1 : Optimal payout policy as a function of γ/β (insiders benefit from waste relative to insider ownership), x/a = 
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Empirical implications, robustness, and further research
Based on the analysis in subsection 2.3 (Table 1) we have the following empirical implications: Other things equal, better governance (lower γ) is associated with more repurchase relative to dividend. Similarly, higher insider ownership (higher β) is also associated with more repurchase relative to dividend. In general, higher return on investment (higher x c = α) is associated with less payout and similarly higher uncertainty about the size of the investment opportunity (higher
) is also associated with less payout. More specifically, firms will not pay out dividends if return on investment is high, but may still repurchase as long as uncertainty about investment size is not too high. However, when both return on investment and uncertainty about the size of their investment opportunities are high, firms will not pay out cash at all.
The model highlights two important properties of open-market programs that dividends do not have. First, unlike dividends which become a commitment once declared, and informally commit the firm to future dividends (the market penalizes firms on dividend reductions), with an open-market program announcement, the firm retains the option not to repurchase. This option is valuable because it gives the firm the flexibility to distribute cash only when it realizes that the cash is indeed free. Second, unlike dividends, repurchases also motivate payout by providing gains to insiders through the firm's informed trade. While these gains to informed insiders are generally viewed in the literature as a negative property of open-market programs (e.g. Barclay and Smith (1988)), we suggest that they do not represent a zero sum game. I.e. the repurchase trade does not only transfer wealth from outsiders to insiders but also increases the social wealth. Together these properties suggest that when shareholders do not want to impose a dividend that may cause managers to shave investment, or cannot impose dividend on the management in order to avoid agency problems associated with the waste of free cash, an open-market program may be the optimal payout tool. If so, then an open-market program can complement dividends and help increase total free cash payout. Recent studies document general decrease in the propensity of firms to pay dividends over the last two decades (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000, 2004) and Fama and French (2001) ). This documented decline started long before the growth in repurchases. These findings are consistent with the argument that repurchases have evolved as a mechanism to encourage payouts when dividends cannot do the job rather than to replace dividends. If this argument is correct, we expect open-market programs to remain an important payout tool in the US even after the tax rate on dividends has been reduced significantly in 2003, and after firms start expensing management/employee stock options.
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The model also provides an alternative to the traditional signaling explanation for the positive announcement return on open-market programs and dividends documented in empirical studies discussed in the introduction. This is because, as demonstrated in Section 3, both increase expected wealth of original shareholders by preventing the waste of free cash.
For our result to have any robustness, it is crucial that γ would not be higher than β. This is of course an empirical question. Empirically, insiders ownership is 1-5% (see, for example, Jensen (2000)). However, especially when the ownership is low, it is easy to increase β with stock options and other performance dependant compensation schemes. 17 As for γ, when governance is good it is reasonable to assume that γ is not of higher magnitude than β. This is because, in this case, as discussed in Section 2, free cash is likely wasted on bad projects rather than on perks, in which case private benefits are very low (i.e. an excess investing of $1 in a failing project is not likely to generate private benefits of more than a few cents to insiders). However, if governance is bad and insiders are able to spend free cash mostly on perks then our story fails because likely private benefits from perks are more than a few cents per dollar spent.
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Our results are also weakened if γ is correlated with β (i.e. if higher ownership gives insider power to extract higher private benefits). Our results also do not apply to the case in which the insiders control the board because for insiders, repurchase always dominates (even when γ 16 The motivation to repurchase in order to hide the dilution due to stock option grants is significantly lower if firms are required to expense stock options.
17 This is consistent with findings about correlation between stock options and repurchases e.g. Kahle (2002) . 18 But even if the free cash is spent on perks, γ may be low. Take a recent scandal, widely discussed in the press, in which a manager spent $150,000 on baseball game tickets. His subjective valuation of the tickets is probably only a fraction of a percent (i.e. if he were to pay for these tickets from his own pocket he would probably be willing to pay much less than $1,500) is high they can falsely announce and then waste). However, if γ is publicly known outsiders can take this into account. This may be another reason why the documented announcement return on repurchase programs and actual repurchases are so low. For regulatory bodies the implication here is that for repurchase to be a useful payout mechanism, γ must be low.
In the model, the firm can choose only one payout method (dividend or repurchase) However, in practice, most repurchasing firms are also dividend payers (see ). In a more complex version of this model, in which free cash has a fixed positive component, it is possible to show that all the certain component of free cash will always be paid out as dividend, 19 whereas the rest would be paid out as in our model, consistent with this evidence. Our story is consistent with Stultz (1990) who suggests that debt level is determined as a tradeoff between the need for financial flexibility and the need to prevent the waste of free cash. This is because payout to debt is even more pre-determined than dividends. When combined with Stultz (1990) , our model may provide a payout-policy-based pecking order that links payout policy to capital structure. Specifically, certain components of free cash are paid through debt (interest), less certain components with dividends, and the most uncertain components are paid with open-market programs, where the actual mix depends on the need for financial flexibility and on how sever agency costs of free cash are. This is in turn because, sever agency problems imply mandatory payout in which case debt is better than dividend and dividend is better than repurchase whereas the need for financial flexibility implies optional payout in which case the order is reversed.
Conclusion
In this paper we considered payout policy as a governance mechanism. Our results suggest that Dividends eliminate agency costs of free cash by forcing cash out but may result is underinvestment if the paid cash is later needed for operations. Open-market programs avoid the under-investment problem by leaving insiders the option to cancel the payout. Instead, they stimulate payout by providing trading gains to these better informed insiders at the expense of the general shareholders. Because their execution is optional, open-market programs cannot always prevent the waste of free cash. Payout policy is thus determined as a trade off between eliminating agency problems (with dividends) and preserving financial flexibility (with openmarket programs).
Appendix A -Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1 : Maximizing (3) over D, is equivalent to minimizing
The function (15) is piecewise linear in D on the segments {(0, C) , (C, E)} so in order to optimize the dividend level, it is enough to compare the value of this function on the extreme points D ∈ {0, C, E}. If D = 0, the value of (15) is
If D = E, the value of (15) is
If
which is always lower/better than (17) , which is in turn what we get for D = E. So choose D = C or D = 0 depending on whether
which can be rearranged to
Proof of Lemma 2 : Condition (5) can be rearrange to
The solution to this quadratic equation is
Given our assumption that N/Q > 3 only the positive solution in (20) is feasible, which is (6).
By inspection of the market maker condition if p > a + x it must be the case that p > a 1− c p which is equivalent to p < a + c. But this cannot hold because of our assumption that α > 1, i.e. x > c. Similarly, if p = a + x the market maker condition implies that p = a + c which in turn implies x = c which also cannot hold. Thus, in any repurchase equilibrium condition (7) must hold.¥ Proof of Lemma 3 : Substituting (6) into the firm participation condition (8) , in any repurchase equilibrium
which can be further rearranged to (9) .¥ Proof of Proposition 1 : Consider the condition for repurchase equilibrium (9). The L.H.S. of (9) is negative whenever γ β
The R.H.S. of (9) is negative whenever
Note that it is always the case that
and hence, whenever (21) holds, (22) never holds, and whenever (22) holds, (21) never holds. Now suppose that condition (21) holds. Then condition (22) does not hold, and we can write (9) as c ≥ c R where c R is defined in (13) . In this case, in c R the numerator is negative, whereas the denominator is positive and, because c is positive, in this situation the condition c ≥ c R always holds, i.e. (9) always holds. Also, because (23) holds, then when (10) holds with equality, condition (9) always holds.
Conclusion: Whenever condition (10) holds, condition (9) always holds. Next, if condition (22) holds, we can write (9) as c ≥ c R , where c R is defined in (13) . Since condition (22) holds, the denominator in c R is negative. But if condition (22) holds, condition (21) never holds, so that c R is negative. Since c is positive, in this situation, the condition c ≤ c R never holds, i.e., (9) never holds. Conclusion: Whenever (22) holds, condition (9) never holds.
In the intermediate region ( 24) both conditions (21) and (22) do not hold. Because (22) does not hold, (9) can be written as c ≥ c R , where c R is defined in (13) . Because condition (21) also does not hold, c R is positive (because in this region both the numerator and the denominator of the c R are positive). Thus, in this region, condition (9) will hold only if c is sufficiently high such that c ≥ c R . Last, conditions (8) and (7) imply that a necessary condition for repurchase equilibrium is (11) , which is more restricting than the requirement (22) , establishing that a repurchase equilibrium never exists if (11) does not hold, and that the range for existence when c ≥ c R is actually (12) rater than (24) .¥ Proof of Proposition 2: by assumption C < X so that C/2 < X/2 and hence C/2 > (C − X/2) and at the same time, by Lemma 2, it is always the case that
and hence whenever a repurchase equilibrium exists, for the outsider shareholders a repurchase program is always better than dividend. At the same time, because a p A −c < 1 and β < 1, then βa p A −c < 1, and hence, whenever a repurchase equilibrium exists a repurchase program announcement is also always better than no payout. Thus, whenever a repurchase equilibrium exists, a repurchase program is the dominant payout strategy for outside shareholders.¥ 6 Appendix B -The effect of repurchase program on investor groups' wealth
With a repurchase, social wealth increases by 0.5(1 − γ)C because the firm has cash only half of the time and managers give up private benefits from waste when they use the cash to repurchase. Now need to consider wealth expropriations In this subsection, we need to consider both the ask and the sell market and therefore revert back to indicating the buy and sell markets with subscripts A and B respectively. The subscript N indicates the case without a repurchase program. We omit the time subscript for t = 1 but not for t = 0 and t = 2. In order to investigate wealth effects of repurchase we need to calculate prices first.
Without a repurchase program announcement
With a repurchase announcement, because there is no adverse selection in the sell market then it is immediate to show that
. From our earlier analysis, with a repurchase program announcement and assuming a repurchase equilibrium,
Let p R 2 be the terminal price in the state with repurchase, and let p NR 2 be the terminal price in the state without repurchase. Then
Next, consider the wealth of investor groups without repurchase program announcement and with repurchase program announcement (in a repurchase equilibrium).
Investor groups' wealth without repurchase program announcement: The firm expected terminal value is A + X 2 (free cash is always lost). Also, Terminal outsiders get
Original outsiders are original shareholders who sell at t = 1 and t = 2. They are liquidity sellers at t = 1 and outside stayers (sell at t = 2) -Liquidity sellers (original who sell at t = 1) get 
¢
One can verify that outsiders wealth + insiders wealth = social wealth. Indeed
Investor groups' wealth with repurchase program announcement in a repurchase equilibrium (parameters are such that repurchase equilibrium holds):
Note that for this to be the equilibrium price, the firm participation condition must hold, i.e.:
The firm's expected terminal value is still the same but now calculate differently. It is 1 2
Expected terminal stock price is
Original outsiders are original shareholders who sell at t = 1 and t = 2. They are liquidity sellers at t = 1 and outside stayers (sell at t = 2)
Total original shareholders is
Note that terminal outsiders get the same as original outsiders. (because in sell market maker get what he pays for).
Expected cash spent on repurchasing shares at t = 1 is
C. Liquidity buyers pay Q A p A at t = 1, and at t = 2 get Q A E[p 2 ]. They make (lose) net of
Note that E[p 2 ] < p A (to be shown later) implies that they lose.
Next, consider the market maker. In the sell market, the market maker pays at t = 1 to
and gets it back at t = 2 when he sells these shares. In the buy market, the market maker gets at t = 1 from liquidity buyers Q A p A . He only pays them Q A E[p 2 ] on t = 2. His expected gain from liquidity buyers is
The market maker gets at t = 1 from the firm expected
is because it happens only half of the time). His expected gain (loss) to the firm is 1 2
Because he must break even in the buy market, his expected loss to the firm must be equal to his expected gain from liquidity buyers. I.e. these last two expressions must be equal (I checked with numerical example. OK.)
Considering his wealth differently (aggregated across dates instead of across investor groups) Total expected that the market maker gets in the buy market at t = 1 is µ
Total market maker pays at t = 2 on his sells in the buy market at t = 1 is
These expressions, too, must be equal. Because the market maker must break even in the ask market then Social Wealth is also expected cash that came out of the firm = repurchase + total cash out at t = 2 = repurchase +terminal outsiders
Outsiders shareholders' wealth with a repurchase (in a repurchase equilibrium) can be calculated as social wealth less insiders wealth which is 
The change in wealth of original outside shareholders less decrease in wealth of liquidity buyers is:
(1 − β)Na 1 2
Alternatively, the change in outsiders wealth can be calculated as change in social less change for insiders is
It is possible to show that these terms are identical. The later calculation however, is much more simple.
Change in social wealth can also be calculated as increase for insiders plus increase for original outsiders less decrease for liquidity buyers=increase for insiders+increase for outsiders, which is (9) holds with equality. In the area above the dashed line a repurchase equilibrium never exists. In the area below the solid line a repurchase equilibrium always exists. In the area captured between the dashed and the solid lines, repurchase equilibrium exits if c>c R , where c R is defined in (11) . 
